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In 1974 a transcript of an executive session of the Warren Commission was released after a prolonged legal battle by a private researcher.³⁵ Classified as Top Secret until its release, it contains a reference by Chief Counsel J. Lee Rankin to the Commission's efforts, "to find out what he [Oswald] studied at the Monterey School of the Army in the way of languages."³⁶ There is no known official record of Oswald having studied there. The Monterey School (the Defense Language Institute), located in California, was operational in 1959. It was, and still is, the linguistic West Point for U.S. military and intelligence personnel who need to learn a language thoroughly and quickly. If Oswald studied there, it would explain his phenomenal progress.

The Monterey School is not a self-improvement institution offering courses to anyone who is interested. In 1959 it was a school for serious training relating to government work, not to the academic whims of military or intelligence personnel. Only those with a certain level of aptitude were admitted, and training was in a language selected for the student by the government, according to needs or assignments.³⁷ If Oswald went there, it would also explain why he was not seen as a threat to

statistics to indicate that attaining Russian fluency requires more than twice as many hours as did Spanish or French—1,100 hours or more, including instruction. Weeks opined that the kind of progress described in Oswald's case would be exceedingly difficult if not impossible to attain in such a short time by using only the radio and self-study props. Such progress would require instructors, Weeks asserted, or, at a minimum, persons proficient in the language who would be willing to converse extensively with the student. Oswald supposedly had no access to either formal or informal tutors.

In 1974 a transcript of an executive session of the Warren Commission was released after a prolonged legal battle by researcher-author Harold Weisberg.³⁵ Classified as "Top Secret" until its release, it contains a reference by Chief Counsel J. Lee Rankin to the Commission's efforts "to find out what he [Oswald] studied at the Monterey School of the Army in the way of languages."³⁶ There is no known official record of Oswald having studied there. The Monterey School (the Defense Language Institute), located in California, was operational in 1959. It was and still is the linguistic West Point for U.S. military and intelligence personnel who need to learn a language thoroughly and quickly. If Oswald studied there, it would explain his phenomenal progress.

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In September 1959 Oswald left the Marine Corps—three months ahead of his scheduled discharge.³⁸ In the first of what was to be a long series of quick and favorable treatment by various government agencies, he was given a dependency discharge because of an injury to his mother.³⁹ The speed of his release surprised his Marine peers.⁴⁰ But the Marine Corps was duped, or so it appears; the discharge was obtained on false grounds. Oswald's mother's injury consisted of a jar falling on her toe while at work. She stayed home for a week, but when she returned she did not mention the injury at all, much less describe it as a continuing problem. This incident took place the year before Oswald's dependency discharge.⁴¹

Perhaps Oswald was in a hurry to get out of the Marines because he had other things to do. In October 1959—one month after his early

discharge—he was on his way to Moscow to defect. As with much of his defection and his return, his journey to Russia is enigmatic.

First, there is the problem of financing. The trip cost at least \$1,000. The Warren Commission decided that Oswald, being frugal, got the money out of his Marine Corps pay.⁴² Before his departure for Moscow, his bank account contained only \$203. He could have squandered \$1,300 in cash and carried it around with him to pay for his trip (but by no means impossible); alternatively, his trip could have been subsidized by someone. Friends and relatives claim not to have given him any money during this period, but perhaps someone else did.

Second, there is the problem of Oswald's itinerary. He left England on October 9 and left October 10, according to the stamps stamped at the London airport.⁴³ His next destination was Heerlen, Holland, en route to Moscow. He arrived there on October 11. But there was no available commercial flight that would have gotten him there there. Either his nest egg of cash was bigger than anyone imagined, or he hired private air transport—or he was flown to Helsinki by military aircraft, private or military.

After arriving in Moscow in October 1959, he told Soviet officials of his desire for Soviet citizenship. The officials were unimpressed, probably more than a bit suspicious. They rejected his request for citizenship and ordered him to leave Moscow within two hours.⁴⁵ His alleged response to this rejection was to slit his left wrist. He was taken to a hospital by a Soviet Intourist guide who found him bleeding in his hotel room. He was then confined to a psychiatric hospital. The Soviets decided his fate. Certainly they must have debated whether Oswald was an authentic defector or a spy. This was an era in which the United States and the Soviet Union were playing extensive games with ostensible defectors.⁴⁶

After waiting several days for the Soviets to make up their minds, he decided to take action. He went to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and denounced the United States, praised the Soviet Union, and announced that he wanted to renounce his U.S. citizenship.⁴⁷ He also made a very dramatic announcement: he stated that he had offered to tell the Soviets radar secrets that he had learned in the Marines. He announced that he "might know something of special interest," and made reference to the U-2.⁴⁸

This action seems counterproductive on Oswald's part. To make threats to the U.S. Embassy might cause officials to panic, to use extraordinary means to stop the young Marine from spilling secrets. The U.S. Embassy did not previously know of Oswald's presence in Moscow.

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it.

Mr. McCloy. I think we will have to cross it.

The Chairman. I think there are some States that by statute.

Mr. McCloy. It is not in New York State, at least not to my knowledge.

Mr. Dulles. I don't know of any.

Mr. McCloy. I don't know in New York State. This law may have been changed since I was more familiar with it.

The Chairman. Whether he has privilege or not, I think he should be made to claim it.

Sen. Russell. We can't afford not to ask him, whatever the law in Texas is we can't afford not to ask him a question.

The Chairman. That is right.

Mr. McCloy. You know in reading over this testimony again, this mass of testimony or evidence we have got here, I notice that Mrs. Oswald, the mother, said perhaps he was an agent, perhaps he might have been an agent, in trying to explain why he went to the Soviet Union.

The Chairman. She has made statements on that.

Mr. Rankin. I think the assertion is in that article in The Nation.

Mr. McCloy. To that effect.

Mr. Rankin. Yes.

Mr. Dulles. Since this has been so much out in the public,

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There was no "testimony." The first witness, Marina Oswald, did not testify until 2/3/64. (Hiff.)

what harm would there be in talking to Hoover without waiving any right to make any investigation in the public?

Mr. McCloy. This is going to build up. In New York I am already beginning to hear about it. I got a call from Time-Life about it. Maybe it is prompted by this letter with these 12 perplexing questions -- no, it wasn't because it came before that. "What is there to this story?"

Mr. Dulles. There is a terribly hard thing to disprove, you know. How do you disprove a fellow was not your agent. How do you disprove it.

Rep. Boggs. You could disprove it, couldn't you?

Mr. Dulles. No.

Rep. Boggs. I know, ask questions about something --

Mr. Dulles. I never knew how to disprove it.

Rep. Boggs. So I will ask you. Did you have agents about whom you had no record whatsoever?

Mr. Dulles. The record might not be on paper. But on paper would have hieroglyphics that only two people knew what they meant, and nobody outside of the agency would know and you could say this meant the agent and somebody else could say it meant another agent.

Rep. Boggs. Let's take a specific case, that fellow Powers was one of your men.

Mr. Dulles. Oh, yes, he was not an agent. He was an employee.

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Francis Gary Powers was a CIA U-2 pilot shot down over the USSR and captured alive. The affair accomplished what the CIA could have expected. It ended the Eisenhower-Khrushchev effort at detente.

give you leads as to how you could examine witnesses if you wanted to.

Mr. Barkin. If you had us out examining witnesses about whether you had the man in your employ, would you feel that we were not very fair to you?

Mr. Dulles. No, I don't think I would.

Mr. Barkin. That wouldn't bother you.

Mr. Dulles. No.

Mr. McCloy. Do you think it might be quite appropriate for us?

Mr. Dulles. It would depend whether there were international complications or foreign government involved, then I might say we would do it in this way or that way to keep from being in trouble with the foreign country.

But as far as the U. S. --

Mr. McCloy. But wouldn't we be putting your agency in great trouble if we went out finding out who your agents were and put out the report and make it public knowledge, wouldn't you think it strange if we didn't come to you with our problem?

Mr. Dulles. Yes, I think it would be.

Mr. McCloy. That is what I think.

Mr. Barkin. Then you would leave doubt you were out investigating around before you had any real leads.

Mr. McCloy. We might get a lead and then we have it and then we have to publish.

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Sen. Russell. There is no man in the employ of the Federal Government who stands higher in the opinion of the American people than J. Edgar Hoover.

Mr. Dulles. That is right.

Sen. Russell. Of course, we can get an affidavit from Mr. Hoover and put it in this record and go on and act on that but if we didn't go any further than that, and we don't pursue it down to Hudkins or whoever it is, there still would be thousands of doubting Thomases who would believe this man was an FBI agent and you just didn't try to clear it up and you just took Hoover's word.

Personally, I would believe J. Edgar Hoover, I have a great deal of confidence in him.

Mr. Dulles. I do, too.

Sen. Russell. But the other people -- I would believe, a simple statement as Holy Writ, this one statement without being under oath, but you can't try cases that way, and you can't base the conclusions of this Commission on that kind of material.

Sen. Cooper. I would like to have your idea about what I suggested.

Mr. McCloy. State it again.

Sen. Cooper. We know these people have been here, so this speculation or rumor is just some official, we will not say approval, but they don't disapprove it.

Mr. McCloy. They have cognizance of it.

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Rep. Boggs. There was no problem in proving he was employed by the CIA.

Mr. Dulles. No. We had a signed contract.

Rep. Boggs. Let's say Powers did not have a signed contract but he was recruited by someone in CIA. The man who recruited him would know, wouldn't he?

Mr. Dulles. Yes, but he wouldn't tell.

The Chairman. Wouldn't tell it under oath?

Mr. Dulles. I wouldn't think he would tell it under oath, no.

The Chairman. Why?

Mr. Dulles. He ought not tell it under oath. Maybe not tell it to his own government but wouldn't tell it any other way.

Mr. McCloy. Wouldn't he tell it to his own chief?

Mr. Dulles. He might or might not. If he was a bad one then he wouldn't.

Rep. Boggs. What you do is you make out a problem if this be true, make our problem utterly impossible because you say this rumor can't be dissipated under any circumstances.

Mr. Dulles. I don't think it can unless you believe Mr. Hoover, and so forth and so on, which probably most of the people will.

Mr. McClure. Allen, suppose somebody when you were head of the CIA came to you, another government agency and said specifically, "If you will tell us", suppose the President of the United

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States comes to you and says, "Will you tell me, Mr. Dulles?"

Mr. Dulles. I would tell the President of the United States anything, yes, I am under his control. He is my boss. I wouldn't necessarily tell anybody else, unless the President authorized me to do it. We had that come up at times.

Mr. McCloy. You wouldn't tell the Secretary of Defense?

Mr. Dulles. Well, it depends a little bit on the circumstances. If it was within the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Defense, but otherwise I would go to the President, and I do on some cases.

Mr. Rankin. If that is all that is necessary, I think we could get the President to direct anybody working for the government to answer this question. If we have to we would get that direction.

Mr. Dulles. What I was getting at, I think under any circumstances, I think Mr. Hoover would say certainly he didn't have anything to do with this fellow.

Mr. McCloy. Mr. Hoover didn't have anything to do with him but his agent. Did you directly or indirectly employ him.

Mr. Dulles. But if he says no, I didn't have anything to do with it. You can't prove what the facts are. There are no external evidences. I would believe Mr. Hoover. Some people might not. I don't think there is any external evidence other than the person's word that he did or did not employ a particular man as a secret agent. No matter what.

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man commission whose task was to monitor the progress of the fledgling intelligence agency. Truman made Dulles deputy director of the CIA in 1951; Eisenhower made him director in 1953.³ Dulles's 11-year reign came to an abrupt and rancorous end in 1961 when President Kennedy fired him during the post Bay of Pigs shake-up of the Agency.

In what must surely rank as one of the more historically significant conflicts of interest, Dulles was appointed by President Johnson to the commission responsible for assessing whether Oswald was linked to the CIA and whether the CIA was linked to the assassination. During most of a crucial period concerning Oswald's possible relationship to the Agency (when he defected to the Soviet Union), Dulles was serving as CIA director. Thus he was in the position of investigating events that occurred under his own stewardship.

Dulles admonished his commission colleagues that proving that Oswald was not a CIA agent was all but impossible because of the Agency's characteristics. It compartmentalized its activities, did not keep paper records of all of its work, coded much of its data in "hieroglyphics," and sometimes would not reveal the identity of its agents even when its officers were put under oath.⁴ After arguing that a definitive conclusion was not possible, Dulles did a complete turnabout and offered to provide one. In order to assuage the continuing concerns of his fellow commissioners, he said he could produce an affidavit that Oswald was not an Agency employee:

Depending as of the time we are talking about, I might have a little problem on that—having been Director until November 1961, it would depend upon as of what time he was supposed to have been an agent of the CIA. The only problem—there is no problem so far as making an affidavit to the period up to November 26, 1961, if you want me to.⁵

If the Commission needed sworn affidavits to forget the dirty rumor, the Agency was prepared to provide a bevy of them, surely at Dulles's suggestion. In direct conflict with what Dulles had told the Commission about the impossibility of a definitive conclusion, the CIA prepared four draft affidavits that stated that Oswald had never been connected with the Agency, either directly or indirectly. These documents were never signed, notarized, or forwarded to the Commission. Four identical affidavits were prepared for four of the CIA's top administrators: Deputy Director Marshall Carter, Deputy Director for Intelligence Ray Cline, Director of Security Robert Bannerman, and Deputy Director for Plans Richard Helms. The statements asserted the following:

Cover-Ups

Lee Harvey Oswald was not an agent, employee, or informant Central Intelligence Agency;

the Agency never contacted him, interviewed him, talked with him, received or solicited any reports or information from him, or communicated with him, directly or indirectly, in any other manner;

the Agency never furnished him any funds or money, or compensated him, directly or indirectly, in any fashion;

Lee Harvey Oswald was never associated or connected, directly or indirectly, in any way whatsoever with the Agency.⁶

This denial would later be used, almost verbatim, by CIA Director McCone in his testimony before the Warren Commission.

A CIA internal memorandum declassified in 1976 reveals that Dulles met with a CIA administrator (probably James Jesus Angleton) who sent by Deputy Director Richard Helms to discuss "certain questions" which Mr. Dulles feels the Warren Commission may pose to the Agency. First on the agenda, not surprisingly, was the dirty rumor. Dulles selected that the allegation that Oswald was connected with the CIA be met with a reply that was "straightforward and to the point." The memorandum should contain language "which made it clear that Lee Harvey Oswald was never an employee or agent of CIA." Furthermore, Dulles insisted the response should state that "neither CIA nor anyone acting on its behalf was ever in contact or communication with Oswald." The memorandum concludes by expressing agreement with Dulles that "a carefully worded denial of the charges of involvement with Oswald seemed most appropriate."

Dulles's helpful suggestions to his Commission colleagues were confined to intelligence matters. At an executive session early in the Commission's deliberations, Dulles sought to relieve the group of its investigative burden before any witnesses had been heard. He tried to put the Kennedy assassination in what he offered as historical context, that it fit the pattern of U.S. history in which assassinations were perpetrated by lone gunmen.⁸

Allen Dulles: I've got a few extra copies of a book that I passed on to our Counsel. Did I give it to you, Mr. Chief Justice?

Chief Justice Earl Warren: I don't think so.

Dulles: It's a book written about ten years ago giving the background of seven attempts on the lives of presidents.

were likely to go nowhere, because it was, "a terribly hard thing to disprove.... How do you disprove it?"²

These were the words of Commissioner Allen Dulles, and his expertise on this matter was indisputable. Dulles was one of the CIA's founding fathers. He was consulted in 1947 when the Agency was created by Congress. The following year President Truman appointed him to a three-man commission whose task was to monitor the progress of the fledgling intelligence agency. Truman made Dulles Deputy director of CIA in 1951; Eisenhower made him Director in 1953.³ Dulles' eleven year reign came to an abrupt and rancorous end in 1961 when President Kennedy fired him during the post-Bay-of-Pigs shake-up of the Agency.

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from Tippit, three were manufactured by Winchester-Western and one by Remington-Peters; the cartridges allegedly found at the crime scene were two Remington-Peters and two Winchester-Western. The cartridges were the last items of evidence to be turned over to the FBI by the Dallas police, a full six days after the murder. This lagged significantly behind the rest of the evidence, leading some to suspect that the shells might have been produced *ex post facto*.

Tippit's own behavior further fuels the controversy surrounding his death. He was three miles out of his assigned district when he was killed. Just before the shooting he had rushed into a store and brushed customers aside to make a phone call. Five witnesses saw him sitting in his parked cruiser in a gas station lot before speeding away. These events occurred not far from where he was killed.

Henry Hurt has provided a possible explanation for Tippit's behavior (*Reasonable Doubt*, pp. 165–68, drawing on the work of researchers Larry Harris and Gary Shaw and journalist Earl Golz). The officer had been involved in a romantic triangle with a woman who lived within a few minutes of the area where his strange actions occurred just before the shooting. Hurt asserts: "The woman's confirmation of the affair supported the original speculation that Tippit's presence far from his own patrol district, his peculiar movements and activities, even his murder, could all be laid to an intensely emotional and explosive set of personal circumstances" (*Reasonable Doubt*, p. 165). The woman's husband had reportedly been greatly upset by the affair and had followed his wife late at night while she was in Tippit's company (Summers, p. 488, drawing on the research of Larry Harris and Ken Holmes, Jr.).

Had Oswald lived to receive a fair trial for Tippit's murder, it is clear that the widely assumed historical "fact" of his killing the policeman while trying to escape after the president's assassination would have been called into serious doubt.

21. The matter of the magazines in Alba's garage is analyzed by Henry Hurt, *Reasonable Doubt*, pp. 296–99. Hurt credits Paul Hoch's 1970 memo to critics. See XXIII, pp. 227–28; XXVI, p. 764; X, pp. 220, 227.

22. XXVI, p. 764; XXIII, p. 728.

23. Hoch memo to critics, 1970, cited in Hurt, *Reasonable Doubt*, p. 298.

24. Truly's FBI statement, November 23, 1963.

25. VII, p. 382.

26. VI, p. 385.

27. Fritz statement INV–2, National Archives documents.

28. VII, p. 383.

29. Meagher, *Accessories*, p. 93; III, pp. 228–32.

30. Anson, "They've Killed the President," p. 349. Anson cites no source for his conclusion and the author was unable to verify it.

31. CE 2003, p. 127.

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33. Meagher, *Accessories*, p. 96.

34. IV, p. 463; HSCA XII, pp. 600–8, especially p. 604.

35. HSCA Report, pp. 221–23.

36. Robert Sam Anson ("They've Killed the President," p. 175n) asserts that the name "Harvey Lee Oswald" appeared in a 1960 list of defectors requested from the CIA by the White House. The names of other defectors were correct, says Anson. He offers no source for this claim and no specific citation for the "list." A page in CD 275, which may be the document Anson was referring to, cites Oswald as "Lee Henry Oswald."

37. HSCA IV, p. 184.

38. Anson, "They've Killed the President," p. 285, citing Peter Dale Scott, "Government Documents and the JFK Assassination" (unpublished monograph).

39. Anson citing Scott as described in Note 38.

40. Philip H. Melanson, "The CIA's Secret Ties to Local Police," *The Nation*, March 26, 1983. Through the Freedom of Information Act, the author obtained 362 pages of heavily deleted documents from the Agency's "Domestic Police Training File." The relationship far exceeded the CIA's euphemism of "training." In some cases police intelligence squads conducted surveillance and even break-ins for the Agency and extracted agents from run-ins with the law. CIA agents were provided with police IDs. In return the Agency dispensed largesse, explosives, and exotic equipment—in some cases, unknown to administrative higher-ups (beyond the intelligence squads) in the departments involved.

41. Warren Report, p. 284.

42. Summers, *Conspiracy*, p. 442.

43. Senate Select Committee to Study Intelligence, "Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy," Book V, pp. 28–31.

44. Summers, *Conspiracy*, p. 440. Summers interviewed U.S. Ambassador to Mexico Thomas Mann, who had dealt with the "D" affair.

45. Warren Report, p. 285.

46. CD 1084.

47. Warren Report, p. 285.

48. Ibid.

49. Senate Select Committee to Study Intelligence, "Investigation of the Assassination of President Kennedy," Book V, pp. 42–43.

CHAPTER 10

1. Thomas Powers, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA* (New York: Knopf, 1979), p. 82.

2. Transcript, Warren Commission Executive Session, December 5, 1963.

3. Wise and Ross, *Invisible Government*, p. 98.